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Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Robert W. Kolb PART I AN OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1. Steven N. Kaplan (2013), `CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 8-25 2. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and David F. Larcker (2003), `Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey', Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 9 (1), April, 27-50 3. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2003), `The Trouble With Stock Options', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (3), Summer, 49-70 4. Arantxa Jarque (2008), `CEO Compensation: Trends, Market Changes, and Regulation', Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 94 (3), Summer, 265-300 5. Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter (2010), `CEO Compensation', Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2 (1), December, 75-102 [28] 6. Michael Faulkender, Dalida Kadyrzhanova, N. Prabhala and Lemma Senbet (2010), `Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22 (1), Winter, 107-18 PART II THE GROWTH AND MAGNITUDE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7. Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein (2005), `The Growth of Executive Pay', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21 (2), Summer, 283-303 8. Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier (2008), `Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (1), February, 49-100 9. Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks (2010), `Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005', Review of Financial Studies, 23 (5), May, 2099-138 10. Richard A. Lord and Yoshie Saito (2010), `Trends in CEO Compensation and Equity Holdings for S&P 1500 Firms: 1994-2007', Journal of Applied Finance, 20 (2), 40-56 11. Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay (2011), `Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay', Review of Financial Studies, 24 (2), February, 402-38 12. Nuno Fernandes, Miguel A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos and Kevin J. Murphy (2013), `Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence', Review of Financial Studies, 26 (2), February, 323-67 13. Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier and Julien Sauvagnat (2014), `CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis', Economic Journal, 124 (574), February, F40-F59 PART III THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 14. Eli Ofek and David Yermack (2000), `Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership', Journal of Finance, LV (3), June, 1367-84 15. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2000), `Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options', American Economic Review, 90 (2), May, 209-14 16. Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf (2005), `Offering Stock Options to Gauge Managerial Talent', Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40 (1-3), December, 189-210 17. Bo Becker (2006), `Wealth and Executive Compensation', Journal of Finance, LXI (1), February, 379-97 18. Jayant R. Kale, Ebru Reis and Anand Venkateswaran (2010), `Promotion Incentives and Corporate Performance: Is There a Bright Side to "Overpaying" the CEO?', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22 (1), Winter, 119-28 19. Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Todd Milbourn, Fenghua Song and Anjan V. Thakor (2014), `Duration of Executive Compensation', Journal of Finance, LXIX (6), December, 2777-817 20. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. (2005), `Executive Pensions', Journal of Corporation Law, 30 (4), 823-55 PART IV ARE HIGHLY PAID CEOS THE WINNERS OF A WAGE TOURNAMENT? 21. Lucian A. Bebchuk, K.J. Martijn Cremers and Urs C. Peyer (2011), `The CEO Pay Slice', Journal of Financial Economics, 102 (1), October, 199-221 22. Zhihong Chen, Yuan Huang and K.C. John Wei (2005), `Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital', Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48 (3), June, 849-85 23. Omesh Kini and Ryan Williams (2012), `Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies', Journal of Financial Economics, 103 (2), February, 350-76 24. Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh (2013), `It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to Top Talent', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27 (3), Summer, 35-55 25. Olubunmi Faleye, Ebru Reis and Anand Venkateswaran (2013), `The Determinants and Effects of CEO-Employee Pay Ratios', Journal of Banking and Finance, 37 (8), August, 3258-72 PART V EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 26. Kevin J. Murphy (2002), `Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options', University of Chicago Law Review, 69 (3), Summer, 847-69 27. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2003), `Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (3), Summer, 71-92 28. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2000), `Agents With and Without Principals', American Economic Review, 90 (2), May, 203-8 29. Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks (2003), `Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation', Journal of Finance, LVIII (6), December, 2351-74 30. Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein (2009), `CEO Compensation and Board Structure', Journal of Finance, LXIV (1), February, 231-61 31. Henrik Cronqvist and Rudiger Fahlenbrach (2013), `CEO Contract Design: How do Strong Principals Do It?', Journal of Financial Economics, 108 (3), June, 659-74 32. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2003), `Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences', Journal of Political Economy, 111 (5), October, 1043-75 33. Martin J. Conyon (2014), `Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms', Economic Journal, 124 (574), February, F60-F89 Volume II Acknowledgements Introduction An Introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I PAY AND PERFORMANCE: ARE THEY RELATED? 1. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2005), `Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues', Journal of Corporation Law, 30 (4), Summer, 647-73 2. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and Randall S. Thomas (2005), `Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?', Michigan Law Review, 103, May, 1142-85 3. Adair Morse, Vikram Nanda and Amit Seru (2011), `Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?', Journal of Finance, LXVI (5), October, 1779-821 4. Alex Edmans and Xavier Gabaix (2009), `Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories', European Financial Management, 15 (3), June, 486-96 PART II: COMPENSATION AND RISK-TAKING: INCENTIVIZING AND RESTRAINING 5. Richard T. Holden (2005), `The Original Management Incentive Schemes', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (4), Fall, 135-44 6. Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran and Joel Shapiro (2010), `Executive Compensation and Risk Taking', Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 456, June, i, 1-43 7. Jennifer N. Carpenter (2000), `Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?', Journal of Finance, LV (5), October, 2311-31 8. Stephen A. Ross (2004), `Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness', Journal of Finance, LIX (1), February, 207-25 9. Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel and Lalitha Naveen (2006), `Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking', Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (2), February, 431-68 10. John McCormack and Judy Weiker (2010), `Rethinking "Strength of Incentives" for Executives of Financial Institutions', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22 (3), Summer, 65-72 11. Zhiyong Dong, Cong Wang and Fei Xie (2010), `Do Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive Risk Taking?', Journal of Banking and Finance, 34 (10), October, 2518-29 12. Neil Brisley (2006), `Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives', Journal of Finance, LXI (5), October, 2487-509 13. George J. Benston and Jocelyn D. Evan (2006), `Performance Compensation Contracts and CEOs' Incentive to Shift Risk to Debtholders: An Empirical Analysis', Journal of Economics and Finance, 30 (1), Spring, 70-92 14. Cory A. Cassell, Shawn X. Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez and Michael D. Stuart (2012) , `Seeking Safety: The Relation Between CEO Inside Debt Holding and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies', Journal of Financial Economics, 103 (3), March, 588-610 15. Yixin Liu, David C. Mauer and Yilei Zhang (2014), `Firm Cash Holdings and CEO Inside Debt', Journal of Banking and Finance, 42, May, 83-100 16. Divya Anantharaman, Vivian W. Fang and Guojin Gong (2014), `Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts', Management Science, 60 (5), May, 1260-80 PART III: EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND FIRM MANAGEMENT 17. Efraim Benmelech, Eugene Kandel and Pietro Veronesi (2010), `Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)incentives', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (4), November, 1769-820 18. Patrick Bolton, Jose Scheinkman and Wei Xiong (2006), `Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets', Review of Economic Studies, 73 (3), July, 577-610 19. Henrik Cronqvist, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd and Jonas Vlachos (2008), `Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?', Journal of Finance, LXIV (1), February, 309-39 20. Ronald W. Masulis and Syed Walid Reza (2014), `Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy', Review of Financial Studies, 28 (2), February, 592-636 A: Managing Assets 21. Tom Nohel and Steven Todd (2004), `Stock Options and Managerial Incentives to Invest', Journal of Derivatives Accounting, 1 (1), March, 29-46 22. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2005), `CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment', Journal of Finance, LX (6), December, 2661-700 23. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008), `Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction', Journal of Financial Economics, 89 (1), July, 20-43 24. Jie Cai and Anand M. Vijh (2007), `Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs', Journal of Finance, LXII (4), August, 1891-933 25. Eliezer M. Fich, Jie Cai and Anh L. Tran (2011), `Stock Option Grants to Target CEOs During Private Merger Negotiations', Journal of Financial Economics, 101 (2), May, 413-30 26. Yixin Liu and David C. Mauer (2011), `Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives', Journal of Financial Economics, 102 (1), October, 183-98 B: Managing Liabilities 27. Hernan Ortiz-Molina (2006), `Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt', Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41 (2), June, 317-40 28. Katharina Lewellen (2006), `Financing Decisions When Managers Are Risk Averse', Journal of Financial Economics, 82 (3), December, 551-89 29. Hernan Ortiz-Molina (2007), `Executive Compensation and Capital Structure: The Effects of Convertible Debt and Straight Debt on CEO Pay', Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43 (1), March, 69-93 30. Paul Brockman, Xiumin Martin and Emre Unlu (2010), `Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt', Journal of Finance, LXV (3), June, 1123-61 31. Sudheer Chava, Praveen Kumar and Arthur Warga (2010), `Managerial Agency and Bond Covenants', Review of Financial Studies, 23 (3), March, 1120-48 Volume III Acknowledgements Introduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I PART I MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND EARNINGS A: Exploiting Inside Information 1. J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak and Michael L. Lemmon (2005), `Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock Options', Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2), May, 445-70 2. David Aboody, John Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su (2008), `Are Executive Stock Option Exercises Driven by Private Information?', Review of Accounting Studies, 13 (4), December, 551-70 3. Robert Brooks, Don M. Chance and Brandon Cline (2012), `Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options', Financial Management, 41 (3), Fall, 733-64 4. Jennifer N. Carpenter, Richard Stanton and Nancy Wallace (2010), `Optimal Exercise of Executive Stock Options and Implications for Firm Cost', Journal of Financial Economics, 98 (2), November, 315-37 B: Manipulating Earnings and Disclosure for Personal Profit 5. Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas Philippon (2006), `CEO Incentives and Earnings Management', Journal of Financial Economics, 80 (3), June, 511-29 6. Keith J. Crocker and Joel Slemrod (2007), `The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation', RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (3), Autumn, 698-713 7. Christopher S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer and David F. Larcker (2010), `Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities', Journal of Accounting Research, 48 (2), May, 225-71 8. Lin Peng and Ailsa Roeell (2014), `Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation', Journal of Finance, LXIX (2), April, 487-526 PART II OPTION DATING GAME 9. Randall A. Heron and Erik Lie (2007), `Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?', Journal of Financial Economics, 83 (2), February, 271-95 10. M.P. Narayanan and H. Nejat Seyhun (2008), `The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase their Compensation?', Review of Financial Studies, 21 (5), September, 1907-45 11. M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun (2007), `The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options', Michigan Law Review, 105 (8), June, 1597-641 12. Jesse M. Fried (2008), `Option Backdating and Its Implications', Washington and Lee Law Review, 65, 853-86 PART III OPTION VALUATION: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE 13. Don M. Chance and Tung-Hsiao Yang (2005), `The Utility-Based Valuation and Cost of Executive Stock Options in a Binomial Framework: Issues and Methodologies', Journal of Derivatives Accounting, 2 (2), September, 165-88 14. Jie Cai and Anand M. Vijh (2005), `Executive Stock and Option Valuation in a Two State-Variable Framework', Journal of Derivatives, Spring, 9-27 15. Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. (2006), `The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options', Journal of Business, 79 (2), 453-87 16. Ronnie Sircar and Wei Xiong (2007), `A General Framework for Evaluating Executive Stock Options', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31 (7), July, 2317-49 17. Jaksa Cvitanic, Zvi Wiener and Fernando Zapatero (2008), `Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options', Review of Financial Studies, 21 (2), April, 683-724 18. Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. (2006), `Valuing Reload Options', Review of Derivatives Research, 9 (1), January, 67-105 19. L.C.G. Rogers and Jose Scheinkman (2007), `Optimal Exercise of Executive Stock Options', Finance and Stochastics, 11 (3), July, 357-72 20. Frank D. Hodge, Shiva Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin (2009), `Do Managers Value Stock Options and Restricted Stock Consisted with Economic Theory?', Contemporary Accounting Research, 26 (3), Fall, 899-932