内容

目次

Preface; Acknowledgments; Part I. The Formative Years: Introduction; 1.An experimental study of competitive market behaviour; 2. Effects of marketorganization on competitive equilibrium; 3. Nature, the experimentallaboratory, and the credibility of hypotheses with D. B. Rice; 4.Experimental auction markets and the Walrasian hypothesis; 5. Experimentalstudies of discrimination versus competition in sealed-bid auction markets;6. Experimental economics: induced value theory; 7. Bidding and auctioninginstitutions: experimental results; 8. Intertemporal competitive equilibrium:an empirical study of speculation with R. M. Miller and C. R. Plott; 9.Experimental economics at Purdue; Part II. Institutions And MarketPerformance: Introduction; 10. On nonbinding price controls in a competitivemarket with A. W. Williams; 11. An experimental comparison of alternativerules for competitive market exchange with A. W. Williams; 12. Competitivemarket institutions: double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions with A. W.Williams, W. K. Bratton and M. G. Vannoni; 13. Markets as economisers ofinformation: experimental examination of the 'Hayek Hypothesis'; 14. Theeffect of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets with A. W.Williams; 15. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science; 16.Experimental economics; 17. A comparison of posted-offer and double-auctionpricing institutions with J. Ketcham and A. W. Williams; 18. Hypotheticalvaluations and preference reversals in the context of asset trading with M.Knez; 19. Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spotasset markets with G. L. Suchanek and A. W. Williams; Part III. Public Goods:Introduction; 20. The principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in socialchoice; 21. Incentive compatible experimental processes for the provision ofpublic goods; 22. An experimental comparison of three public good decisionmechanisms; 23. Experiments with a decentralised mechanism for public gooddecisions; 24. Experimental tests of an allocation mechanism for private,public or externality goods with D. L. Coursey; Part IV. Auctions AndInstitutional Design: Introduction; 25. Incentives and behaviour in English,Dutch and Sealed-bid auctions with V. M. Coppinger and J. A. Titus; 26.Theory and behaviour of single object auctions with J. C. Cox and B.Roberson; 27. A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-firstauction non-isomorphism with J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker; 28. Theory andbehaviour of multiple unit discriminative auctions J. C. Cox and J. M.Walker; 29. Theory and individual behaviour of first-price auctions J. C. Coxand J. M. Walker; 30. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slotallocation with S. J. Rassenti and R. L. Bulfin; 31. Designing 'smart'computer-assisted markets with K. A. McCabe and S. J. Rassenti; Part V.Industrial Organization: Introduction; 32. An empirical study ofdecentralised institutions of monopoly restraint; 33. Natural monopoly andcontested markets: some experimental results with D. Coursey and R. M. Isaac;34. In search of predatory pricing with R. M. Isaac; Part VI. Perspectives OnEconomics: 35. Theory, experiment and economics; 36. Experimental economics:behavioural lessons for microeconomic theory and policy.